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A visitor to the New England countryside stopping to ask directions
from one of the natives is apt to receive the unsettling reply: "Stranger,
you can't get there from here." The flinty retort is, of course, a logical
fallacy, and so the lost traveler might insist that one can always get
anywhere from anywhere, one way or another. Nevertheless, before
pointing out the correct path, the obdurate Yankee will solemnly
declare that to get there one really ought to begin someplace else.
In the essay that follows I will be taking the New England point of
view with regard to some particularly rocky philosophical terrain: the
terrain of evolutionary biology. I am primarily concerned with what
natural selection means for ethical and moral reasoning, and here, I will
argue, Yankee wisdom holds unbendingly true: You can't get there
from here; you really ought to begin someplace else. To those who take
their bearings from Darwinian theory, my thesis may be summarized
by that old cartographer's premonition: Warning. There be dragons
ahead.
Perhaps the best place for us to begin is with what Darwin actually
said. In outline, I will first review how Darwin's ideas about morality
emerged from his general theory of natural selection. Next, I will show
how these ideas of Darwin's were influenced by, and interacted with,
the ethical philosophy of utilitarianism. I will then discuss the so-called
"naturalistic fallacyn-the impossibility of deriving values from
facts-and show how this impossibility foiled the early romance
between Darwinians and utilitarians. I will next discuss the ethics of
Friedrich Nietzsche, whose nihilism some scholars insist cannot be
linked with Darwin's theory, but whose ideas others believe are a
logical conclusion to The Descent of Man. We will then see how some
evolutionists have sought to avoid the nihilistic implications of natural
selection by resorting to an untenable fact-meaning dichotomy that
rapidly breaks down under scrutiny. Finally, I will highlight the
questionable status of natural selection as intellectual orthodoxy, and
the ironic mantle of heterodoxy that now falls on those who persist in
the older traditions.

Darwin 5 Theory Revisited
Charles Darwin's theory of natural selection was inspired not primarily
by his observations of the natural world, but by Thomas Malthus's theory
of scarcity. According to Malthus in his Essay on Population published in
1798, human population growth would increase geometrically until it
outran food supplies unless checked by war, famine, or disease.*Darwin
was deeply impressed by Malthus's gloomy presentiment, which he saw
as having a broader significance for all organisms. "[Elvery single organic
being around us may be said to be striving to the utmost to increase in
numbers," he wrote in B e Origin of Species in 1859. Further,
lighten any check, mitigate the destruction ever so little, and the number
of the species will almost instantaneouslyincrease to any amount. The face
of Nature may be comparedto a yielding surface, with ten thousand sharp
wedges packed close together and driven inwards by incessant blows,
sometimes one wedge being struck, and then another with greater force.2

Suffering, destruction, and death were thus the winnowing tools that
allowed stronger and better adapted organisms to survive.
Under these circumstances, Darwin saw, any slight advantage that one
organism gained over another would be critical to its success, while at the
same time spelling its rival's doom. The mechanism, he believed, by whch
such competitive adaptations arose in nature, was random mutations. Pure
chance conferred unpredictable advantages on the offspring of certain
organisms. These products of indiscriminate luck were then preserved over
generationsaccording to the brute law of self-interestin the struggle for scarce
resources. Through the accumulation of new mdfications over time, some
creatures evolved-and diversified, while organisms that failed to keep pace in
the mutational arms race were crushed to extinction by their more fierce or
wily competitors.
The origin of the moral sense, it logically followed, was simply
another adaptation aimed at ensuring human survival; its status was
wholly relative to the function it performed. In i%e Descent of Man,
published in 1871, Darwin laid bare this fact, outlining how, through
selective pressures, emotions, sociability, morality, and religion, all
emerged as byproducts of biological necessity.
According to Darwin, social instincts induce animals to render
valuable services to one another, ranging from baboons grooming each
other to wolves hunting in packs. As a rule, the greater the cooperation
'See Robert Heilbroner, The WorldlyPhilosophers: %Lim, Times,and Ideas of the Great
Economic Thinkers, 7th ed. (New York: Touchstone Books, 1999),75-105.

'Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, ed. J. W. Burrow (London: Penguin Books,
1968), 119.

between members of a community, the greater their offspring. The extent,
however, to which creatures can engage in such acts of reciprocal altruism
is strictly determined by their ability to communicate effectively. In the
case of humans, more elaborate forms of cooperation emerged as a result
of language development. As the wishes of the community came to be
better expressed, Darwin believed, 'the common opinion of how each
member ought to act for the public good would naturally become in a
paramount degree the guide to action."' This, then, was the essence of
morality: biological utility mediated by social contracts.
Once the first links in the chain of cooperation were forged, social
instincts were reinforced through sensations of pleasure at in-group success,
and, conversely, feelings of pain at social ostracism. " [ m e individuals which
took the greatest pleasure in society would best escape various dangers,"
Darwin wrote, "while those that cared least for their comrades and lived
solitary, would perish in greater numbers." Group sympathies in this way
became so strong that the mere sight of another person suffering could create
feelings of pain in those witnessing the fact. "We are thus impelled to relieve
the sufferings of another, in or& that o w own painfiilfeelings m a y be at the
same time rel~ixmt'~
(emphasis supplied). Courage, honesty, and compassion
might, therefore, develop along purely Darwinian lines of instinct and
carefully masked self-interest.

Darwin s' Ethics
The vacuousness of morality for its own sake, nevertheless, did not lead
Darwin and his colleagues to despair. Critics of natural selection charged that
the theory inspired an elitist ethic of "might makes right." But this could not
be farther from the truth so long as the biological success of human beings
included such elements as cooperation and sympathy. There was, thus, no
contradiction between the ideals of liberalism and the laws of evolution. If
anything, many of Darwin's supporters believed, his theory could be seen as
providing scientific grounds for a radical new egalitarianism-a fact not lost
upon Karl Marx, who offered to dedicate the English edition of Das Kapital
to Darwin (though Darwin declined the honor).'
Darwin's political and ethical views were both pragmatic and optimistic,
influencedto a significantextent by the philosophy of John Stuart Mill. Eight
years before 7heDescent ofMan was released, Mill published Utilitarianism,
his famous argument for a universal ethic based upon calculations of the
'Charles Darwin, 7he Descent ofMan (New York: P. F. Collier and Son, 1902), 186.

'Ibid., 144-145.

'5. W. Burrow from the preface to Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species.

common good. "Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle," wrote Mill,
"holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness,
wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness." This did not mean
that individuals were free to satisfy their personal desires with complete
disregard for other members of society, for maximal happiness, by definition,
included the pleasure and pain of all human beings, and even "the whole
sentient creation." The entire field of ethical inquiry was, therefore, reduced
to a simple question: What action most increases, in quantity and quality, the
total happiness of humankind?
Calculations of this sort clearly left room for individual acts of heroism
and selflessness. Such actions, though, were deemed virtuous only insofar as
they contributed to the success of the group. "The utilitarian morality does
recognize in human beings the power of sacrificing their own greatest good
for the good of others," Mill declared. "It only refuses to admit that the
sacrifice is itself a good. A sacrifice which does not increase, or tend to
increase, the sum total of happiness is considered wasted."'
In Darwinian terms, "happiness" is a chemical or psychological state
selected by nature to reinforce biologically successful behavior. ("[E]motions
are just evolution's executioners," says Robert Wright.? The transition from
statementsof fact about the "sum total of offspring" in Darwin to statements
of value about the "sum total of happiness" in Mill, was, therefore, practically
seamless. After the social instinctswere formed, Darwin wrote in llbe Descent
of Man: "The 'Greatest happiness principle' will have become a most
important secondary guide and object." Utilitarian morality, by implication,
is the only morality under the laws of evolution.
In mid-nineteenth-centuryEngland,utilitarian ethics were closely linked
to the doctrine of progress. Mill believed that the application of his
philosophy to society at large, accomplished through political and legal
pressure, would eventually eliminate unhappiness altogether. "m]ost of the
great positive evils of the world are in themselves removable and will, if
human affairs continue to improve, be in the end reduced within narrow
limits," he wrote. "As for the vicissitudes of fortune, and other
disappointmentsconnected with worldly circumstances,these are principally
the effect either of gross imprudence, of ill-regulated desires, or of bad or
imperfect social institution^."'^
bJohnStuart Mill, On Libwtyand Utilitarianism (New York: Bantam, 1993), 144,150.
'Ibid., 155.
'~obertWright, The Moral Animal (New York: Vintage, 1994), 88.
'Darwin, The Descent of Man, 164.
'%ill, Utilitarianism, 153-154.

The solution to the problem of human suffering, thus, lay within the
grasp of political and legal structures guided by reason: there was nothing
inherent to the human condition to deny the ultimate perfectibility of
humankind.
For Darwin, natural selection posited no final destination or purpose.
Still, he predicted, the trajectory of evolution would lead to a utopian world
order based upon the same utilitarian principles espoused by Mill. "As man
advances in civilization, and small tribes are united into larger communities,
the simplest reason would tell each individual that he ought to extend hls
social instincts and sympathiesto all the members of the same nation, though
personally unknown to him," he wrote. "This point being once reached,
there is only an artificial barrier to prevent his sympathies extending to the
men of all nations and races . . . becoming more tender and more widely
diffused, until they are extended to all sentient beings.""
Standards of morality, through inheritance, would in this way rise
higher and higher until humans rejected all "baneful customs and
superstitions" and instinctively treated each other according to Christ's
golden rule, albeit for natural rather than spiritual reasons. Darwin's own
long opposition to slavery is perhaps the best illustration of the
humanistic spirit that would come to characterize society. By his own
account, he was merely hastening the inevitable.
Historians of science frequently discuss Darwin's theory of origins as
challenging the creation story of Genesis. Far less consideration is given
to Darwinism as prophecy, as the new Revelation. In the economy of
belief, however, evolution functioned not only as a scientific conjecture
about the past, but as a secular reformulation of traditional Christian
eschatology. Nature, "red in tooth and claw" in Alfred Lord Tennyson's
famous words, would ultimately redeem humanity through her own inner
workings. "Looking to future generations, there is no cause to fear that the
social instincts will grow weaker, and we may expect that virtuous habits
will grow stronger, becoming perhaps fixed by inheritance," declared
Darwin. "In this case the struggle between our higher and lower impulses
will be less severe, and virtue will be triumphant."'*

The Hinge
The undoing of the utopian dream lay in a single word: ought. At first
glance, the transition from statements of fact in Darwin to statements of
value in Mill appears to be seamless. Upon closer examination, though, the
fatal flaw in the argument becomes clear: in a purely Darwinian universe, no
"Darwin, 73e Descent of Mdn, 166.

statements of value can be made. Ever. Every appeal to beauty, honor, justice,
compassion, or purpose is excluded by hypothesis, so there is no standard by
which any behavior can be judged, whether positively or negatively.
Ethical precepts in this regard have no intrinsic meaning or claim on
human conduct, but are simply additional facts of natural selection to be
catalogued alongside strong talons and sharp teeth. If something seems
inherently right or good, it is only because what seems right generally aids
humans in their struggle to survive. Yet should any particular moral trait
cease to fulfill its biological function, morality would simply "evolve"-a
euphemism to say that outworn ethics shall undergo extinction.
Alternatively, individuals might retain an adaptively sterile code of moral
behavior, but merely as a relic of their biological ancestry-an appendix
to the soul.
In his classic treatise on liberal education, The Abolition of Man, C. S.
Lewis exposed the futility of any ethical system founded on these premises.
Values, evolutionists tell us, are masks for self-interest and biological
necessity. We must, therefore, learn to critically appraise all pretensions
of goodness through the lens of reason. But what about the values of our
educators? Lewis asks. "Their skepticism about values is on the surface: it
is for use on other people's values: about the values current in their own
set they are not nearly skeptical enough."" Consider the cries of
indignation that scientists who write about the selfishness of all human
behavior would evince if someone suggested that their own profession was
based upon rules of narrow self-interest that had nothing to do with
reason. Or, consider the utilitarian ethics scientists often invoke.
Sociobiologists declare that the "real" value of seemingly virtuous
behavior lies in the utility of that behavior to the community. A
firefighter bravely sacrificing himself to save others is thus praised for
serving the common good. To say that the death of an individual will
serve the good of the community, though, is merely to say that the deaths
of some people are useful to other people. O n what grounds, then, are
particular individuals asked to die for others? A refusal to sacrifice oneself
is surely no less rational than consent to do so.
Strictly speaking, Lewis pointed out, neither choice can be rational, or
13C.S. Lewis, %Abolition o f h n (New York: Macrnillan Publishing, 1955), 41. Lewis, I
am aware, was no biblical literalist. Yet his positive statements regarding the idea of organic
evolution do not weaken his critique of what he variously called "orthodoxDarwinism," "the
Scientific Outlook," ''universal evolutionism,"and "modem naturalism.""I am certain that in
passingfrom the scientificpoint of view to the theological,I have passed from dreamto waking,"
he wrote in his essay, "Is Theology Poetry?""Christiantheology can fit in science, art, morality,
and the sub-Christianreligions. The scientificpoint of view cannot fit in any of these things, not
even science itself." See idem, "Is Theology Poetry" in 'Ihey Asked for a Paper, C. S. Lewis
(London: Geoffrey Bles, 1962), 21 1.

irrational, at all. "From propositions about fact alone no practical conclusions
can ever be drawn. %is will preserue society cannot lead to do this except by
the mediation of society ought to be preserued" (emphasis original)." But
without reinstating the transcendent ideals banished by natural selection,
whence do we derive the idea that society ought to be preserved?
The Darwinian ethicist cannot appeal to the self-evident goodness of
society--or even life-for then the same appeal to self-evident goodness could
be made on behalf of virtues, such as justice and compassion, regardless of
their utility. Philosophical materialism-that surly bouncer at the party of
scientificinquiry--must expel all oughts that do not present an is calling card.
In the end, we are left with a conception of morality based not upon
reason, but upon the mere fact of instincts. Humans sacrifice themselves for
the good of the species not for any ultimate purpose, but in obedienceto their
natural urges. If these urges can be exaggeratedin selected groups through the
fiction of values, so much the better for the rest of us. Meanwhile, for those
of us who are "in the know," all the old taboos are swept away at last.
Sacrifice, being meaningless, may be avoided if others can be found to
perform the task. Sexual desire, being instinctive, may be gratified whenever
it does not endanger the species. Individual life, being expedient, may be
ignored or disposed of whenever it does not serve the interests of the group.
Darwin understood all of this perfectly. Although he was not immune
from the utopian spirit of his day, he also saw that his theory in fact left no
foundation for morality of any kind. It could only endlessly describe
behavior generated by instincts or whims. "The imperious word ought seems
merely to imply the consciousness of the existence of a rule of conduct,
however it may have originated," he wrote in B e Descent ofMan (emphasis
original).15Earlier, in %e Originofspecies, he had praised queen bees for their
"savage instinctive hatred" of their young.16Now he implied there was no
essential difference between bee morality and human morality:
If, for instance, to take an extreme case, men were reared under
precisely the same conditions as hive-bees, there can hardly be a doubt
that our unmarried females would, like the worker-bees, think it a
sacred duty to kill their brothers, and mothers would strive to kill their
fertile daughters; and no one would think of interfering1'

Interference, after all, would only hinder the total happiness of the hive.
Evolutionists, like Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor, have thus taken upon
themselves the tragic burden of truth for the sake of the greater happiness.
14Lewis, The Abolition ofMan, 41.
15Darwin, The Descent of Man, 157.
16Darwin, The Origin of Species, 230.
"Darwin, The Descent of Man, 187.

Knowing that the facts of natural selection will potentiallyerode any basis for
morality, prominent evolutionaryphilosopher Daniel Dennett suggests that
the ideal of the "transparent society" might need to be abandoned-elites
should allow the community to misunderstand what is actually being said.18
In one of his notebooks, Darwin expressed a similar view:
[Natural selection] will not do harm because no one can be reallyfully
convinced of its truth, except man who has thought very much, & he
will know his happiness lays in doing good & being perfect, & therefore
will not be tempted, from knowing everything he does is independent
of himself to do harm (emphasis original).19
What is good for English gentlemen, Robert Wright interprets in The
Moral Animal, might not be good for the impressionable masses. Wright
goes on to make the startling statement that the prevailing moral ethos of
many university philosophy departments is nihilism, and that this can be
directly attributed to Darwin." The full philosophical implications of
evolution, he notes, have long been the trade-secret of scientists. But for
the sake of the many, shouldn't we be grateful for their silence? Total
happiness may require, well, intellectual subterfuge.

From Reason to Nihilism
And yet. What about those who opt out of happiness? Although Darwin
himself believed that utilitarianism was the logical outworking of natural
selection, Mill is but one of several patron saints in the pantheon of
evolutionary philosophy. An equally compelling vision of morality based
upon evolutionary concepts may be found in the writings of Friedrich
Nietzsche.
The problem with all previous explanations of morality, Nietzsche
declared in his magnum opus, Beyond Good and Evil, was that they took
morality itself as a given. Yet what society had come to perceive as evil
was originally acknowledged as good. What traditional ethics-corrupted
by Judeo-Christian teachings-condemned as vice were merely untimely
atavisms of older ideals. In the premoral period (vaguely associated in
Nietzsche's mind with preSocratic Greece), the value of a deed was
determined not by the actor's motives, but by the action's consequences.
Strength, cunning, and brutality held no moral stigma, but were simply
18DanielC. Dennett, Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings ofL+ (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 509.
'?Darwin, as cited in Wright, The Moral Animal, 350.

2%id., 328. Wright's project, it should be noted, is not to critique but to defend Darwin's
vision and to rehabilitate sociobiology from its exile in the hinterlands of academic discourse
following the twin disasters of American and Nazi race eugenics.

expressions of human vitality. "Strong wills" thus dominated "weak wills"
as a means to their own self-preservation, while all effective energy was
"will to power."
The moral period marked a reversal of this situation as deeds came to be
judged by their underlying motives rather than their results. Nietzsche
ascribed this readjustment in human psychology to religion, and particularly
Christianity. "'God on the cross.' At no time or place has there ever been
such a daring reversal, a formula so frightful, questioning, and questionable
as this one," he wrote. "It ushered in a reevaluation of all ancient values."21
Primarily, Christianity asserted the equality of all individuals and
sided with those who suffer. Nietzsche found this notion-which he
termed "slave-moralityn-utterly insipid. "Among humans as among every
other species of animal, there is a surplus of deformed, sick, degenerating,
frail, necessarily suffering individuals," he wrote. By siding with these
weaklings, Christianity had caused "the degeneration of the European
race." It had "bred a diminished, almost ludicrous species, a herd animal,
something good-natured, sickly, and mediocre.""
In opposition to the emasculated slave-morality of Christianity,
Nietzsche proposed an ethic of the "free spirit" in which the noble elite
engaged in their own projects of value creation and self-mastery.What was
required of the Nietzschean paragon was the "hardness of the hammerYn2)
the rejection of unmanly and morbid pity for others:
We are of the opinion that harshness, violence, enslavement, danger
on the street and in the heart, seclusion, stoicism, the art of the
tempter and every kind of devilry, that everything evil, frightful,
tyrannical, predatory, and snake-likeabout humans serves to heighten
the species "human being" as much as does its opposite.24

Apologists for Nietzsche suggest that his philosophy has been
misunderstood and distorted. No doubt this is true. But Nietzsche's
defenders give away too much: the impression that his ideas were harmless
betrays historical reality.z The suggestion that Nietzschean ethics find no
support in Darwin is equally disingenuous. As it happens, Nietzsche may
have never read Darwin and expressed only contempt for the naive social
"Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Marion Faber (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1998), 44.

"Friedrich Nietzsche, 7%e Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York:
Viking Press, 1954), 563.

Beyond Good and Evil, 41.
'+~ietzsche,
25See,e.g.,JonathanGlover's Humanity:A Moral History of the TwentiethCentury (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 11-44.

Darwinism that prevailed during his day. He was repulsed by the fact that
under natural selection the weak herd may collectively overcome the strong
few. And he resented the fatalisticundertones of the theory, which he deemed
a threat to his own project of creating a new "science" of the Free Spirit.
These significant differences in vision lay behind Nietzsche's "Anti-Darwin*
diatribe in lZe Will to Power.26
Still, philosopher Hans Jonas points out, Nietzsche's nihilism is
demonstrably connected with the impact of Darwinism. "The will to power
seemed the only alternative left if the original essence of man had evaporated
in the transitoriness and whimsicality of the evolutionary process."27It was
precisely the inability of optimistic British gentlemen, such as Spencer and
Huxley, to see that the old morality was truly dead and gone that Nietzsche
sneered at-not Darwin's notion of morality emerging from the welter of
chance and competition for scarce resources. Nietzsche railed against the
"plebeianism of modern ideas," and insisted that the will to power could not
be explained in material terms." Yet his genealogy of morals, in fact, rested
upon two ideas, both scientifically validated by the theory of natural
selection: first, all of existence should be understood in terms of a constant
struggle; and second, the natural world contained no inherent meaning. "If
Nietzsche is the father of existentialism," writes Dennett, "then perhaps
Darwin deserves the title of grandfather"m-absent Darwin's worldview,
Nietzsche's would have had little intellectual currency.
Natural selection, Dennett goes on to declare, is "the universal acid";
it radically corrodes and ultimately destroys every traditional concept and
belief in its path, whether in matters of cosmology, psychology, human
culture, religion, politics, or ethics. Under natural selection, we are indeed
"beyond good and evilv-or so a great many of Darwin's most widely read
interpreters and defenders insist.

Gould 3 God
In the end, we may discover that we are able to order our lives in spite
of-not because of-what we believe to be true: that morality is nature's
greatest ruse. Staunch evolutionists are loving parents and upright citizens.
26
John Moore, "Nietzsche's Anti-Darwin," a paper presented at the 11th Annual
Conference of the Friedrich Nietzsche Society, Emmanuel College, Cambridge, September
8,2001, on the web at: www.mith.demon.co.uk.

27HansJonas, The Phenomenon of Life (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
1966), 47.
"Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, as cited by Moore, "Nietzsche's Anti-

Darwin."
?Dennett, Damin's Dangerous Idea, 62.

Darwin himself was one of the most decent and humane figures of his
time. But whether the moral reserves of human instinct prove stronger
than the new value relativism remains to be seen. A more pessimistic view
is that Western culture, steeped in philosophical and scientificindifference
to good and evil, is rapidly expending its inherited value fat, the spiritual
capital of its Jewish and Christian heritage.
Ironically, this latter premonition is no longer merely the grist of
theologians. It is the avowed goal of sociobiologists to demonstrate that all of
our loftiest ideals are grounded in purely pragmatic impulses toward genetic
self-preservation. But some scientists are unable or unwilling to concede the
old morality. Paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould is one such individual.
Conscious of the impossibilityof derivingvalues from facts, he has attempted
to articulate a new relationship between Darwinian science and religious
belief. Is there no way, he asks, that natural selection and religion c A be
defined in mutually respectful and beneficial terms?
Gould proposes what he calls the 'Principle of Non-Overlapping
Magisteria" or NOMA. According to this principle, science (by definition
Darwinianism) and religion can be perfectly harmonized by a simpledivision
of labor. "Science tries to document the factual character of the natural world,
and to develop theories that coordinate and explain these facts," he writes,
while religion attends to the entirely unrelated realm of "meaning and moral
value." All attempts to create a Darwinian ethic are thus inherently flawed
since they invariably encroach on the domain of metaphysics. However,
religion for its part must refrain from making any claims about "factual
reality." Once religion is weaned away from erroneous statements of fact,
Gould maintains, we will realize "a respectful, even loving, concordat
between the magisteria of science and religion.*30Wouldn't this solve the
problem of post-Darwinian morality once and for all?
I think not. By saying that it is the business of religion to ascribe
meaning to the inherently purposeless facts of nature, Gould merely
recasts religion as a less angst-filled variety of existentialism. But if no
natural occurrence contains any purpose or meaning in itself apart from
a human projection of value upon it, what distinguishes the claims of
religion from purely philosophical attempts to generate meaning and
values out of the void? What gives religious ethics any credence if divine
justice and purpose are merely wishful metaphors that we can safely say
have never interposed themselves uponfactual reality?Having chopped its
legs from under it, will evolutionists now command the truncated torso
of religion to pick up its bed and walk?
''Stephen Jay Gould,Rocks of Ages: Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life (New
York:Ballantine, 1999),4,6,9-10.

Nor will it do to simply post a marker at the boundary between the
biological and social sciences-*Thus far but no furthern-as Gould and
others are wont to do. Darwin, we have already seen, was the first to
extend the logic of his theory to questions about religion and morality. He
may have done so with greater reticence than many contemporary
evolutionists, but not with less philosophical necessity or consequence.
"The theory of evolution is not just an inert piece of theoretical science,"
writes Mary Midgley. "It is, and cannot help being, also a powerful folktale about human origins." Hence, scientists "calling for a sanitary cordon"
to keep facts and values or scientific and human concerns apart are calling
for something that is "both psychologically and logically impossible."''
Yet Gould's overture to religion is not mere dissembling. The
evolutionary lobotomy of the soul is the death of goodness. Even more,
the treacherous kiss of materialism spells the death of reason: if there is no
value in anything, there is no value in thought. After Darwin, Jonas
observes, both the classical understanding of man as homoanimal rationale
and the biblical view of humanity as created in the image of God are
blocked. Reason is thus reduced to a means among means toward the
individual's survival:
[A$ a merely formal skill-the extension of animal cunning-it does not
set but serves aims, is not itself standardbut measured by standards outside
of its jurisdiction. If there is a "life of reasonnfor man (as distinct from the
mere use of reason), it can be chosen only nonrationally, as all ends must
be chosen nonrationally (if they can be chosen at all). Thus reason has no
jurisdiction even over the choice of itself as more than a means. But use of
reason, as a means, is compatiblewith any end, no matter how irrational.
This is the nihilistic implication in man's losing a "being" transcending the
flux of becoming."

No scientist can long tolerate such a repudiation of the mind, so
somehow the old values must be surreptitiously readmitted through rear
' ' ~ a rMidgley,
~
Evolution as Religion: Strange Hopes and Stranger Fean &ondon:
Routledge, 1992), 1, 15-21. There is, of course, a sense in which it is possible to speak of some
scientific and some religious matters as each having their own particular concerns within "nonoverlapping spheres." But Midgley's point remains. We can only value things within a factual
context that makes our valuing intelligible, while brute facts can only be grasped and ordered
within a framework of values and beliefs. So neither facts nor values can be conceived in radical
isolation from each other. Further, the theory of evolution according to natural selection is not
itselfa mass of facts: it is a historicalconjectureby which factual data may beconnected,ordered,
and valued. It is, in other words, a worldview very much on the "values and meaning" side of
the equation. Gould's NOMA says that all our troubles will go away if we simply learn to
embrace more than one worldview at the same time. Unfortunately, this remedy proves a very
poor placebo when the conflict between materialist and nonmateridist worldviewsis precisely
what is at issue.

"Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, 47.

entrances. Gould selects the back door of personal sentiment, writing
about the richness of Berlioz's Requiem and the goodness of baseball. The
emotive power of music and play, he suggests, is meat enough to sustain
us as we wander to and fro in the factual wilderness. Lest we insist upon
more rigorous logic, he diverts us with obtuse jargon. ("Science and
religion interdigitate in patterns of complex fingering, and at every fractal
scale of self-similarity."33)
Wright, meanwhile, tries to reclaim traditional morality through the
semblance of reason, telling us that Christ and Buddha were the ultimate
self-help gurus. But all this scrambling after ancient wisdom is futile.
Evolutionists have sawn off the limb on which they were perched. Lewis
predicted the final contortions of education in the materialist mold. 'In a
sort of ghastly simplicity we remove the organ and demand the function.
We make men without chests and expect of them virtue and enterprise.
We laugh at honour and are shocked to find traitors in our midst. We
castrate and bid the geldings be fruitf~l."'~

Orthodoxy, Old and Nae,
But what about the evidence? Thls, many will insist, remains the crux of the
matter. We may not like the philosophical implications of natural selection,
but we must still account for factual data in a way that is intellectually honest.
What, then, are the alternatives? For many scientistsand educators, there can
be none. Intellectual honesty compels assent to evolution along Darwinian
lines sincematerialisticexplanations are, by definition, the only rational ones.
Natural selection, we are told, was validated by individuals methodically
pursuing an irrefutable empirical trail. That Darwinism is true is thus selfevident to anyone who has made a pilgrimage to the proper museum to gaze
at the sacred bones.
Unfortunately, this account of Darwin's success, however sincerely
believed or widely disseminated, is based upon a specious notion, namely,
that materialism is a value-neutral method for interpreting factual data. It
is not within the scope of this essay (nor the abilities of the author) to
survey scientific challenges to natural selection. One need not be an
expert, though, to detect a certain ill pallor, a weird and unwholesome
glow, in statements such as the following one by Harvard biologist
Richard Lewontin on the actual relationship between the empirical
evidence and Darwin's theory: "Our willingness to accept scientific claims
that are against common sense is the key to an understanding of the real
struggle between science and the supernatural." He continues:
"Gould,Rocks of Ages, 65.
34Lewis,The Abolition of Man, 35.

We take the side of science in spite ofthe patent absurdity of some of its
constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfill many of its extravagant
promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific
community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior
commitment, a commitment to materialism. It is not that the methods
and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material
explanation of the phenomenal world but, on the contrary, that we are
forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an
apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material
explanations, no matter how counterintuitive, no matter how
mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover that materialism is absolute for
we cannot allow a divine foot in the door.35
The implication could not be more clear. When evolutionists tell us
that we must accept certain "unsubstantiated just-so stories," in spite of all
countervailing reason, evidence, and common sense, it is clear that their
interest is no longer primarily the discovery of truth. It is inculcating "the
uninitiated" in the arcanum of a quite specific religious orthodoxy." The
word for such religious practice is fundamentalism.
Let us, then, take the actual empirical evidence at face value: smallbrained, human-like hominids appear to have been in existence for over
three million years. Now, how does this fact relate to Darwin's
mechanism of natural selection-the only mechanism presently admissible
in scientificdiscourse?What are the ethical dimensions of Darwin's theory
as it relates to human development? How shall we understand the
persistent connections between Darwinism and nihilism in the field of
philosophy? And what are the social and political implications of seeing
the world through Darwin's eyes, through the lens of philosophical
materialism? Textbook representations of the "fact" of natural selection
have been less than forthcoming that these problems exist. The horns of
the dilemma are, it seems, that evolutionists must either deny the fact of
morality or abandon materialism as a paradigm to explain human nature
and origins, and a great deal else besides. Most are unwilling to make the
courageous cut, so instead they simply suppress the questions. Yet the
questions, like so many fossils in a geological column, persist.
A final word on Genesis and mythological thinking. Throughout this
essay I have argued that Darwinian theory is a highly corrosive
philosophical cul-de-sac, but I have said little about any alternative path or
my own beliefs about human origins. In fact, there may be numerous
35~ichard
Lewontin, as cited in J. Budziszewski, ?%e Revenge of Conscience (Dallas:
Spence, 1999),6.
3b"Evolution,"
Midgley, 33, writes with no small piquancy,"is the creation myth of our
age."

alternative paths worth exploring, from Christian natural law theory to
Aristotelian metaphysics. I am open to whatever insights may be gleaned
from all of these. I also do not doubt that there are truths to be learned
from Darwin himself; natural selection might well explain much of
biological diversity. The nonmaterialist, G. K. Chesterton pointed out,
can cheerfully admit a great deal of natural development according to
physical laws into her worldview-it is the puritanical materialist who
cannot allow any specks of the supernatural into his spotless machine.
My own heritage and study, however, have led me to a position
probably best described as that of a "creationist." I use the word
deliberately, despite its awkward pedigree not because I subscribe to a
wooden literalism in reading the Bible, but because I can find no
progress in the fact-meaning dichotomy set forth by Gould and
embraced by so-called "process* theologians such as Reinhold Niebuhr
(whose theology Stanley Hauerwas traces with sympathetic but
ultimately devastating effect back to Darwin via ~ i l l i a m
~ames)').
Either
the biblical creation story, in contrast to other creation myths, limns the
contours of an actual event, or it is a false metaphor, a hollow conceit.
History-what has happened in space-time-matters. And it matters not
just for our thoughts, but for our feelings, our relationships, our values,
and our actions.
The position I am advocating is close, I think, to that of J. R. R.
Tolkien, a writer who fully understood myth and metaphor, and who
deplored the dogma of scientism as unqualified Truth. In a letter to his
son Christopher he wrote:
I think most Christians, except the v. simple and uneducated or those
protected in other ways, have been rather bustled and hustled now for
some generations by the self-styled scientists, and they've sort of tucked
Genesis into a lumber-room of their mind as not very fashionable
furniture, a bit ashamed to have it about the house, don't you know, when
the bright clever young people called: I mean, of course, even thef;deles
who did not sell it secondhand or bum it as soon as modern taste began to
sneer. . . . In consequence they have (myself as much as any), as you say,
forgotten the beauty of the matter even "as a story."38

The age of the earth and the precise order and nature of the creation
might not be clear from the two Genesis accounts, Tolkien concludes, but
the Garden of Eden-and our exile from it-are meaningful only so far as
they are accepted as historical facts.
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